Progress in Colombia?

Jamie

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« on: January 09, 2004, 05:00:00 AM »

Here are some excerpts on Colombia from the latest issue of The Economist Magazine.

Last year, over 16,000 suspected members of the country's two leftist guerrilla groups, and of its right-wing paramilitary vigilantes, either surrendered or were killed or captured. That amounts to more than half of the three irregular armies' estimated total strengths.

Colombia's overall murder rate fell to around 50 per 100,000 people in 2003—still high by international standards, but the lowest figure since 1986, according to Fundación Seguridad y Democracia (FSD), a Bogotá consultancy.

For the first time in recent years, the number of new internal refugees caused by the violence fell substantially, to 156,188.

According to new government figures, there were a mere 2,043 kidnappings in 2003, down from 2,986 in 2002.

The security forces have fought more than 2,300 battles with the irregular armies (up from 1,338 in 2002), losing 523 dead while killing 2,980.

Behind the figures lies a big security build-up, supported by American aid totalling around $2.5 billion since 2000.

President Uribe's strategy has two main elements. First, the armed forces have taken the offensive. In the second half of 2003, the army and air force did much damage to FARC units in north-western Colombia, around Bogotá and Medellín. They killed or forced the surrender of half a dozen mid-level guerrilla commanders. This has helped to blunt FARC's efforts to mount an urban bombing campaign.
Second, the government is attempting to recapture territory, and establish a presence throughout the country. A plan to expand the police was completed last month, with contingents placed in all 158 municipalities that lacked them when the president took office in August 2002—no small matter in a country more than twice the size of France. In some places, the police are being backed up by a new force of local part-time “peasant soldiers”.

Ordinary Colombians feel safer, and, partly as a result, the economy is reviving. GDP grew by an estimated 3.2% last year, the best posting since 1997. Juan Carlos Echeverry of LatinSource, a New York-based consultancy, points out that the capital flight of recent years has now been reversed, and investment and imports of capital goods are both growing.

The government has yet to hit FARC where it would hurt most: its longstanding bastions in the south and east, in departments such as Meta and Caquetá. This is where the guerrillas have their training schools, weapons factories and arms dumps, and garner some support from the local population.

Congress last month approved a new anti-terrorism law that gives the army judicial powers, of arrest and search, as well as phone-tapping. Mr Uribe insists that the powers will be temporary (the law expires in four years), will be used only against “terrorism”, and will be subject to congressional oversight.

Jamie
Engage The Exotic
International-Introductions.com


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Ricardo

Guest

Re: Progress in Colombia? (Long)

« Reply #1 on: January 09, 2004, 05:00:00 AM »

... in response to Progress in Colombia?, posted by Jamie on Jan 9, 2004

Excerpted from Semana (centrist newsmagazine), Bogotá, Colombia, July 7-14, 2003

http://www.worldpress.org/Americas/1326.cfm

The government’s security policy assumes that the illegally armed groups feed on the absence of central authority and that, therefore, the way to protect citizens is to guarantee the presence of strong and legitimate institutions across the whole country. “Security isn’t principally coercion; it is the permanent and effective presence of democratic authority in the territory,” says the lengthy document penned by the minister of defense with the participation of other ministries......

In this sense there is much to learn from what has happened this year in the rehabilitation zones in Arauca and Montes de María [in northern Colombia], which were created according to a similar plan. Establishing the legitimacy of the state through the presence of its institutions has proved to be the most difficult thing to accomplish: How can the state make its presence felt in the arenas of health, education, and justice if it has no money? ....

The third axis of the policy is popular participation: Stopping violence is this government’s top priority, but everyone must contribute. How? By denouncing crime, paying taxes, offering jobs to demobilized combatants, absorbing the displaced, refusing to pay ransom to kidnappers, and collaborating with the authorities.

Establishing transparency and legitimacy in Colombia’s government institutions is one of the Democratic Security Policy’s central goals. In other words, respect for human rights is its starting point and its ultimate objective. We hope that this, and every, aspect of the policy will be executed as sensibly as it was written.